Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1940

California Packing Corporation v. Industrial
Commission of Utah and Juanita Lewis Johnson :
Reply Brief of Plaintiff
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
DeVine, Howell & Stine; Neil R. Olmstead; Plaintiff 's Attorneys;
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, CPC v. ICU, No. 6305 (Utah Supreme Court, 1940).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/722

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

CALIFORNIA PACKING CORPORATION,
a corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

No. 6305

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
and JUANITA LEWIS JOHNSON,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF

DEVINE, HOWELL & STINE and
NEIL R. OLMSTEAD,
Plaintiff's Attorneys.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

CALIFORNIA PACKING CORPORATION,
a corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
No. 6305
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
and JUANITA LEWIS JOHNSON,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF

In view of the fact that defendants apparently fail to
comprehend the position taken by the plaintiff in this matter,
we feel constrained to file this reply to defendants' brief to the
end that there may be no doubt as to just what plaintiff is
contending.
We do not urge that the average daily operation of
plaintiff's business during the year next preceding the injury,
or for any other period, is the basis for determining what is
"usual operation." What we do urge is that the Commission
must find from the evidence before it what is the usual operation, and in making that finding, all of the competent evidence
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must be considered. Here the parties entered into a stipulation
showing the operation of plantiff's business over a period of
fifty-four weeks prior to the injury. It is by reason of this
showing of the fifty-four week operation that we say that the
Commission must use the same as the basis in making its
determination as to what was plaintiff's usual operation. Had
the evidence before the Commission been limited to a showing
of the operation for but a four week period, or a one week
period, or a six month period, or a five year period, we would
say that the determination of plaintiff's usual operation must
be based upon that evidence, and that the Commission would
not be justified in basing it upon anything other than all of
the evidence before the Commission in that regard. Here the
evidence disclosed the operation over a fifty-four week period.
The Commission is not justified in disregarding that evidence
and basing its determination upon the operation of the business at the time of the injury.
Nor do we urge, as suggested by defendants, that plaintiff's usual operation consists of the average weekly operation
over this fifty-four week period, which average weekly operation is approximately 5.69 days per week. All we urge is that
the evidence relates to a fifty-four week period-that during
such fifty-four week period, plaintiff's business consisted of
19 five day weeks, 16 five and one-half day weeks, 11 six day
weeks, and 8 seven day weeks; that it is apparent upon the
face of this evidence that the usual operation of plaintiff's
business was not seven days per week, but, on the contrary,
was six days or less per week. Had the evidence disclosed
simply that for a period of six weeks prior to the injury,
plaintiff's business had been operating seven days per week,
we would then agree with the Commission that upon the
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evidence, the usual operation of plaintiff's business was seven
days per week. But here, the evidence discloses that plaintiff
had forty-six weeks of six days or less per week, as compared
to eight ·weeks of seven days. The only finding that can be
made from that evidence is that the usual operation of
plaintiff's business was six days or less per week.
Defendants, however, argue that the evidence discloses
that seven days per week was a usual operation of plaintiff's
business for this season of the year. This assertion is made
with absolutely no evidence to support it, and directly in the
teeth of the uncontradicted evidence. The deceased was
injured on October 13, 1939. The evidence shows that at this
season of the preceding year, plaintiff's business operated but
50 days per week. We specifically direct the Court's attention to the stipulation which shows that during the week
ending October 8, 1938, plaintiff's business operated but 50
days a week, and that during the week ending October 15,
1938, plaintiff's business operated but 50 days per week, and
that it was not until the week ending July 8, 1939, that plaintiff's business operated for more than six days per week. To
now assert that seven days per week was the usual operation
of plaintiff's business for this season of the year is to do so
with absolutely no evidence to support it, and in the face of
the uncontradicted evidence.
Defendants further apparently take the position that it
is the number of days per week that the injured is employed
at the time of his injury that controls as to which formula is
to be used. That is, if he is in fact working seven days per
week when injured, his compensation should be based upon
seven day employment per week. This is evidenced by the
following appearing at page 4 of the defendants' brief:
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"'fo take another example: Suppose Mr. Johnson had
been employed only a week or two before he was fatally injured. If plaintiff's contention is to prevail, his
compensation would not be fixed by the weekly wage
he actually received when injured, but by the average
number of days per week that the plaintiff had been
operating the preceding year. There is no language
in the act which justifies such conclusion."
It is not apparent why the defendants inject the matter of
weekly wage into the foregoing, because, so far as plaintiff
is concerned, there is no question with respect thereto. The
only question is whether the formula for seven day employment per week or whether the formula for five and one-half or
six da-y employment per week shall be used. We do not, and
never have, disputed that the wage at the time of the injury
is the wage to be considered, but it does not follow therefrom
thcit the number of days per week of operation at the time of
injury is controlling. The statutes are specific on this. As to
weekly wage, the statute provides:

"The weekly wage of the injured person at the time
of injury shall be taken as the basis upon which to
compute benefits."
There is no similar provision with respect to determining
employment per week. On the contrary, the statute provides
that five and one-half, six, or seven day employment per week
shall be based upon the "usual operation" of plaintiff's business. It is significant that these two matters are dealt with
by the legislature in the same-paragraph of the statute (Section
42-1-70, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as am~nded by
Chapter 41, Laws of Utah, 1937; page 8 of plaintiff's brief).
With reSpect to weekly wage, the legislature provided that the
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time of the injury should govern, while as to the number of
days employment per week it provided that the usual operation
of the business should govern. With this in mind, it is impossible to conceive that the legislature intended the same rule
to govern, else there would have been no occasion to make any
distinction as to the wage and the weekly period of employment; indeed, the word "usual" might as well have been
omitted. Had the legislature not meant "usual" operation, it
certainly would not have used that word. And the fact that
the deceased was working seven days per week at the time
of the injury certainly does not establish that seven days per
week constituted plaintiff's usual operation.
'Ve heartily agree with defendants' statement near the
bottom of page 4 of their brief that the length of the deceased's
employment by plaintiff is immaterial in determining whether
the employment is five and one-half, six or seven day employment per week. Whether the employee has been employed
but a week, a year, or ten years, it is still necessary to determine the usual operation of the employer's business. The
length of time the individual has been employed therein, is
absolutely immaterial. The amount of compensation to which
an injured employee is entitled, or his dependents in the event
of his death, is neither increased nor reduced by length of
service.
It leads us nowhere to pose hypothetical situations as
defendants do on page 4 of their brief, wherein they "Suppose
a business operates seven days per week for only one month
a year and is closed down during the remainder of the year";
or "Also, if a business is operated only one week of seven days
during a given year * * *." The answer to such suppositions
must be the same as in the case before us. The formpla to
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be used in determining compensation must be the one in
accord with the "usual operation" of the employer's business.
The writer is frank to state that he would have considerable
difficulty in finding that a business that operates but one week
a year, and during that week for seven days, is a business that
"usually operates" seven days per week. The obvious answer
is that such a business does not "usually" operate seven days
a week. The same difficulty would be encountered with a
business that has fifty-one five day weeks and one seven day
week. It would take a considerable stretch of the imagination
to hold that such business usually operates seven days per
week.
Defendants have continuously throughout their brief referred to the question of weekly wage, and assumed that some
question involving the same was raised by these proceedings.
At page 4 of their brief, they say:
"Also, if a business is operated only one week of seven
days during a given year, it may not be successfully
maintained that a person who is injured or killed during that week shall be entitled to compensation on the
basis of 1/52nd of his actual weekly wage."
The writer does not know who is seeking to maintain such a
proposition. Certainly not the plaintiff. We agree that the
weekly wage at the time of the injury is to be used as the
basis; not 1/52nd thereof, nor any other fraction. But the
question of days of employment per week is something entirely
different. That depends on the usual operation of the employer's business, not upon a factual situation at the time of the
injury.
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The defendants further assert:
"The case of 1\'lorrison-Merrill Co. v. Industrial Commission, 81 Utah 363; 18 P. (2d) 295, lends support
to defendants' contention."
If defendants' contention is that the weekly wage as of the

date of the injury is to be used in determining compensation,
plaintiff agrees therewith, because such case specifically so
holds. On the contrary, if defendants' contention is that the
Commission was right in using the formula for seven day
employment in determining benefits, then plaintiff denies that
such case supports in any wise such contention, because that
matter is not considered by the Court in that case.
Respectfully submitted,
DEVINE, HOWELL & STINE and
NEIL R. OLMSTEAD,
Plaintiff's Attorneys.
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